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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 15432

KARL J. STAVAR,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The presentation of these sections made by appellant
are satisfactory.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the trial court decision
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except as noted below, the presentation of facts
made by appellant is satisfactory.
Appellant states that the motion to dismiss was
granted without prejudice by the trial court.
of the proceedings does not state this.

The transcript

On page 11 of the

transcript the judge merely stated that "I dismiss the accusation."
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ARGUMEUT
POINT I
THE STATE HAS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR
APPEAL SINCE UTAH CODE ANN. § 77 - 7-1
( 19 5 3) , AS AMENDED , IS CRIMINAL IN
SUBSTANCE, AND THE STATE CAN ONLY APPEAL
FROM CRIMINAL ACTIONS WHEN ALLOWED TO BY
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-39-4 (1953).
The procedure followed when pursuing an action under
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-7-1 (1953), as amended, is set out in

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2, et seq.
Code of Criminal Procedure.

The title of Title 77 is

Although the exact characteriza-

tion to be given to the term "malfeasance in office" is one of
the issues of this brief, there is no doubt that the procedures
used when bringing an action under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1
(1953), as amended (hereinafter 77-7-1), are those allowed for
criminal actions, even when pursuing a charge of "malfeasance
in office."
The grounds for appeal available to the state in a
criminal proceeding are limited by Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4
(1953) (hereinafter 77-39-4) which states:
An appeal may be taken by the state:
(1) From a judgment of dismissal
in favor of the defendant upon a
motion to quash the information or
indictment.
(2) From an order arresting judgment.
(3) From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the state.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(4) From an order of the court
directing the jury to find for
the defendant.
Therefore, the issues to be confronted are: (1) does an action
brought for malfeasance in office fall within the limitations
imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1953), and, if so, (2)
in this particular case, is the state prohibited from appealing the lower court ruling.
Appeals from actions brought under 77-7-1, as
amended, should be limited by 77-39-4 on the basis of a logical construction of the statutes, since both fall under the
same title.

To interpret 77-7-1 as falling outside of the

limitation of 77-39-4 would result in allowing an action
falling within criminal procedure guidelines not to be covered
by its express limitations.
An action does not need to be "wholly criminal" in
application to fall under 77-39-4.

In Hartman v. Weggeland,

19 Utah 2d 229, 429 P.2d 978 (1967), an appeal by a county
attorney and city judge from an order that certain depositions
be made avialable to the defendant in a criminal case, the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
It might be argued that because the
state is not a named party this
matter is civil in nature, and hence
the quoted section (77-39-1] does
not apply. However, the veneer is
civil. The substance is criminal.
(~mphasis added.)
The court went on to hold that the 77-39-4 limitations
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

applied, and that appeal was barred.
Although no Utah "malfeasance" cases have directly
ruled on this point, all of the cases have emphsized the need
for protection of the defendant in this type of action and
have demonstrated that an action brought for malfeasance in
office is criminal in substance.

In State v. Geurts, 11 Utah1c

345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961), the court stated:
. . due to the serious consequences to a defendant so charged
[with malfeasance in office] , it
is also important to maintain such
protections for the accused as can
be done consistent with the purpose of the statute.
In State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965), the
court reinforced the protection due a defendant in a malfeasance in office action:
. . . the statute should be
strictly construed against the
authorit! invoking it and liberally in avor of the one against
whom it is asserted.
(Emphasis
added.)
Later in the opinion, the court stated:
. . . the privilege of choosing
and electing public officials
and repudiating them if and when
they so desire, belongs exclusively to the people, and that
neither the courts nor any other
authority should be hasty to
encroach upon that right.
It is clear that as a result of the express holding
in Hartman extending 77-39-4 to matters that are criminal in
-4-
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substance, and the tenor of Geurts and Jones concerning the
protection due to one charged with malfeasance in office, the
limitations of 77-39-4 should be applied to action brought
under 77-7-1, a sister chapter in the same title.

To rule

otherwise would allow the State to proceed with all of the
effect and force of a criminal proceeding without any of the
statutory restraints.
Since 77-39-4 should be applied to actions brought
under 77-7-1, the question becomes whether or not in this
particular case 77-39-4 bars an appeal by the State.

The

State in this case proceeded against the defendant on the
basis of an accusation, as provided for in 77-7-2.

It must

be noted that the term "accusation" was present in the 1953
version of 77-7-1, the same time 77-39-4 was enacted without
mentioning an "accusation."
Section 77-39-4 expressly authorizes certain appeals
by the State, thus disallowing any grounds for appeal not
stated therein.
part of 77-39-4.

The term "accusation" is not found in any
Therefore, appeal from a dismissal of an

accusation is prohibited.

It might be argued that the appeal

is civil in nature; however, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
do not have any provision relating to appeal from a dismissal
of an accusation.

By omitting the term "accusation" from any

of the bases available for appeal, it must be presumed that
the legislature did not intend to permit an appeal to be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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taken by the State when the court quashes an accusation.
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted 77-39-4 very
strictly.

In State v. Overson, 26 Utah 2d 313, 489 P.2d 110

(1971), the State appealed from an order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds of trial court error.

The

court held that this basis for appeal did not
fall within any [basis for
appeal] of the highlz restrictive
statute, Sec. 77-39- , U.C.A.
1953, specifying the instances in
which the state may appeal.
(Emphasis added.)
This same reasoning was used in dismissing an appeal in State
v. Callahan, 26 Utah 2d 304, 488 P.2d 1048 (1971).
If an appeal by the State in a matter that is
criminal in nature is not expressly allowed under 77-39-4, it
is barred.

Since actions brought under 77-7-1 should fall

under the restrictions provided for in that chapter, appeal
by the State from the dismissal of an accusation should fall
within 77-39-4.

In this case, the State has no statutory

grounds for appeal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THERE MUST BE A CONVICTION PRIOR TO
PROCEEDING UNDER 77-7-1 AND 77-7-2.
The logical reading of 77-7-1 demonstrated that a
conviction of (1) a felony, or (2) an indictable misdemeanor,
or (3) a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or (4) of

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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malfeasance in office is necessary in order to remove persons
from office.

This requirement of a conviction can be shown

by the legislative intent,

the case law, the construction of

the statute, and the alternatives available to a party
attempting to remove a public official from office.
A long line of Utah cases states that the primary
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry into
effect the intention of the legislature.

Taft v. Glade, 201

P.2d 285 (Utah 1948); Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232
P.2d 766 (1951).

In Johnson v. State Tax Cormnission, 17

Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
The fundamental consideration
which transcends all others in
regard to the interpretation
and application of a statute
is: What was the intent of the
legislature? All other rules
of statutory construction are
subordinate to it and are helpful only insofar as they assist
in attainin~ that objective.
(Emphasis a ded.)
The history behind the enactment of the present
77-7-1 is helpful in determining the intent of the legislature.

Prior to 1967, 77-7-1 read:
All officers not liable to impeachment shall be subject to
removal for high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance in
off ice as in this chapter provided.

-7-
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The word "conviction" did not appear anywhere in the statute;
rather, the statute seemed to require misdoing "in office"
for removal, leaving an official who committed crimes outside
of office immune from removal.

The Utah Supreme Court inter-

preted the statute in this manner in State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d
190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965), resulting in a county auditor serving
time in jail for failure to file an income tax return while
holding on to his county position.
As a result of the Jones decision, Representative
Frost of the Utah State Legislature sponsored an amendment to
77-7-1.

On February 2, 1967, debate concerning House Bill 82

(amending 77-7-1) took place.

(See attached exhibit.)

The

following excerpts from the debate clearly demonstrate that a
conviction for any of the offenses listed in 77-7-1 is necessary in order to remove an official from office.
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: . . . I
would like to give you just a
little bit of background on this
bill. It came about through
the incident here in Salt Lake
County of Mr. Jones being convicted and being sent to prison
while in office, and so I decided
that probably there was something
that needed to be done about the
bill.
. . . the law should be
clarified and strengthened . . .
that it was very definite and
clear how he [a person who performed misconduct in office] could
be removed from office.
REPRESENTATIVE COX: Such accusation may be initiated by any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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taxpayer. Now I am wondering
about that, does that mean that
the bum that has bought a pack
of cigarettes downtown and is
arrested by the sheriff and
taken to the jail because he
was inebriated or was a vagrant,
that he could come out of jail
day after tomorrow and by making
a sworn statement make that
sheriff defend himself before
the District Court, is that the
meaning of this.

REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

. . . we
did not make this harsh enough
so that any little picky accusations like that they could commence accusation for removal.
They have to be convicted of a
felony to begin with.
. . . one
thing that we wanted to get away
from .
. that some crank could
not start procedures without any
basis for this procedure.
.
this spells out very clearly that
before anything definitely can be
taken care of or proceedings be
started that he would have to be
. . . shown beyond any reasonable
doubt that he was ~uilty of some
of these crimes.Emphasis added.)
The sponsor of the bill emphasized that conviction of a crime
was a prerequisite to initiating action under 77-7-1.
The State wants 77-7-1 interpreted so that it would
read:

"

. shall be subject to removal

. . upon malfea-

sance in office or upon being convicted of a felony, an indictable misdemeanor, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude."

Not only is this construction illogical and a direct

contradiction of the legislative intent, it also is contrary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to Utah case law.

In Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333

P.2d 943 (1959), the Utah Supreme Court confronted the problem of interpreting a series of words in which the only connective is the word "or."

The court ruled that the disjunctive

"or" applies to the entire series of words, in that case
interpreting "consent to a chemical test of

. his breath,

blood, urine or saliva" to mean "consent to a chemical test
. of breath or blood or urine or saliva."

Applying this

ruling to the present case, the only logical construction of
77-7-1 is that it requires conviction of a felony, or an indictable misdemeanor,

~a

misdemeanor involving moral turpi-

tude or malfeasance in office.

Just as the word "consent"

applied to each individual type of test in Ringwood, the word
"convicted" applies individually to each type of offense in
77-7-1.

It might be argued that requiring a conviction for
77-7-1 limits taxpayer and grand jury rights under 77-7-2 and
77-7-4, which allow them to bring accusations against public
officials.

However, as can be ascertained from the excerpts

of the debate on House Bill 82, the legislature wanted to
control the manner in which taxpayers could attempt to oust
public officials.

It would be chaotic to allow taxpayers to

bring removal proceedings without some form of check on their
action, such as a requirement of a prior conviction.

As the

statute now reads, if a public official is convicted of one of
-10-
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the listed offenses under 77-7-1, a taxpayer is allowed to
initiate action for removal under 77-7-2.
upon public enforcement agencies.

This is a check

Should they decide not to

proceed against a convicted official for political or other
reasons, the taxpayer and/or grand jury are not left without
recourse.
Since a conviction is required under 77-7-1 to
remove a public official, this creates two problems:

(1) the

term "malfeasance in office" is rendered inoperative since it
is not codified, and one cannot be convicted of an uncodified
crime, and (2) determining what recourse is available to remove a dishonest official in order to protect the public.
The argument that the term "malfeasance in office"
is rendered invalid if a conviction is required is not controlling.

Section 77-7-1 also lists as grounds for removal

"an indictable misdemeanor," and under the present Utah
Criminal Code "an indictable misdemeanor" does not exist.
This merely illustrates that the Utah State Legislature did
not take into consideration all facets of the existing law
when the new criminal code was enacted in 1973.

This alone

is not enough to justify distortion of a statute so as to
render all parts totally operable.
The new code does provide for an action that can
be brought against public officials who are derelict in their
duty.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-201 provides:
-11-
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A public servant is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor if with an
intent to benefit himself or
another or harm another, he
knowingly commits an authorized
act which purports to be an act
of his office, or knowingly
refrains from performing a duty
imposed on him by law or clearly
inherent in the nature of his
office.
Thus, the legislature has provided for an action with which
a public official, if convicted, could fall within the removal
section of 77-7-1, even if the term "malfeasance in office"
is determined inoperative.
Respondent therefore submits that the following
would be consistent with the legislative intent and statutory
construction:
1.
That conviction of one of the
listed offenses is required to proceed
for removal under 77-7-1.
2.
That a taxpayer or grand jury
can bring an action to remove an elected
official under 77-7-1 as a check on
prosecuting officials who fail to act if
the official has been convicted of one
of the listed offenses.
3.
That other statutes, particularly 76-8-201, provide adequate guidelines to proceed against official misconduct, even if "malfeasance in office"
is no longer an effective grounds for
removal.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE ACCUSATION FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTIOU.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The accusation in the present case was brought
against the respondent for "connnitting malfeasance in office,
in that during his term as chief of police said defendant
did intentionally and knowingly breach the trust imposed on
him

"

The issues are:

(1) is malfeasance in office

a viable means of "accusing" a public official, and (2) even
if it is, was the accusation sufficient to bring such a
charge.
Since 77-7-1 requires a party to be "convicted" of
the listed offenses in order to be removed from office, and
there is no crime of "malfeasance" for which an official can
be convicted, accusing a party of malfeasance is not a viable
means for initiating removal from office.

"Malfeasance in

office" was characterized in the Geurts case as being "quasicriminal," therefore, most standards for criminal proceedings
were applied to charges of malfeasance in office at the time.
Since then, 77-7-1 has been amended to require a conviction
for removal of office, thus characterizing "malfeasance in
office" as a crime.

However, malfeasance in office is not

codified, and in 1973, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 was enacted,
which states:
Connnon law crimes are abolished
and no conduct is a crime unless
made so by this code, other
applicable statute or ordinance.
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, under present statutory guidelines, an action for
-13-
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malfeasance in office cannot be prosecuted.

This does not

leave the State without recourse against dishonest officials,
as was demonstrated in Point II of this brief.
Even if malfeasance in office is held not to fall
completely within criminal procedure guidelines, the accusation in this case fails for lack of sufficiency as shown in
Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711 (1922).

In Burke, a

case in which a Utah official was accused under a statute
identical to 77-7-1 before it was amended in 1967, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
The pleader must state in ordinary and concise language the
particular acts or things done
by the accused which constitute
the offense he is charged with
having cormnitted.
The court later stated:
Until (the actual thing or act
complained of . . . is fully
set forth and pointed out in the
accusation) the accusation must
be held insufficient for want of
facts . . . .
The court also stated that mere conclusions of law were not
enough to maintain such an action; explicit facts detailing
the accusation were required.
Forty years later, the Utah Supreme Court again
confronted the specificity requirement of the term "malfeasance
in office" in Geurts.

Although the court held that the term

was not so vague as to be unconstitutional, the court defined
-14-
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-"malfeasance in office" as:
(requiring) an intentional
act or omission relating to the
duties of a public office, which
amounts to a crime, or which involves a substantial breach of
trust imposed on the official by
the nature of his office, and
which conduct is of such character as to offend against the
commonly accepted standard of
honesty and morality.
In Geurts, the indictment stated with specificity the acts
which constituted the offense of which the official was
charged.
The result of the holdings in Burke and Geurts is
that specific acts are necessary to proceed against an individual charged with malfeasance in office, and that these
acts must be specified in the accusation.

In the case at

hand, the accusation fails to meet these standards.
The accusation against the respondent merely states
that he has committed malfeasance in office, a legal conclusion, and that he "did intentionally and knowingly break the
trust imposed on him by virtue of his office to a substantial
degree and in such a way as to offend against the commonly
accepted standards of a person in his office," a legal conclusion worded within the Geurts definition.

However, Geurts

does not state that the acts constituting the offense need
not be specified.

In Geurts the acts were specified and

therefore not at issue.
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Burke has not been overruled.
quirements of that case still control.

The specificity reThe accusation against

the respondent does not specify the acts with which the

resp~

dent has been charged, therefore the decision of the trial
court that the accusation fails for want of sufficiency should
stand.
CONCLUSION
The trial court decision dismissing the accusation
against respondent should be upheld for three reasons:
1.
The State has no basis for
appeal under Title 77, the title
under which this action was brought.

2.
As shown by the legislative
intent and the construction of 77-7-1,
a conviction is necessary prior to instigating a removal action under that
section.
3.
The accusation was insufficient to state a cause of action under
the Burke-Geurts guidelines.
To hold otherwise would result in a direct repudiation of the legislative record, while at the same time creating
a queasy quasi-criminal action that would allow a prosecuting
official or taxpayer the complete advantages of criminal process without any of the criminal process restraints.

~sp~fully submitted,

I

1

1

Phil L. Hansen
HANSEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent were delivered to counsel for appellant,
Robert B. Hansen, attorney general, and Robert R. Wallace,
assistant attorney general, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114,
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of January, 1978.
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February 2, 1967
EXHIBIT
HOUSE BILL No. 82.
BY: Frost, et al.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE-PUBLIC OFFICIAL

TO AMEND SECTIONS CONCERL~ING R.EJ.~OVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO
PROVIDE SUCH REMOVAL UPON CONVICTION OF FELONY, INDICTABLE
MISDEMEANOR OR ONE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE: PROVIDE
INITIATION THROUGH PRESENTATION OF SWORN ACCUSATION IN
DISTRICT COURT BY ANY TAXPAYER ..... .
THIRD READING HOUSE BILL No. 82
TRANSCRIPT OF DEBATE
REPRESENTATIVE FROST: .... Mr. Speaker, and fellow representatives thank you for extending the courtesy of circulating this bill for me.

I would like to give you just a

little bit of background on this bill.

It came about through

the incident here in Salt Lake County of Mr. Jones being convicted and being sent to prison while in office, and so I
decided that probably there was something that needed to be
done about the bill.

I read in the paper where the governor

and other officials said that the law was not clear on cases
like this and that it should be cleared up, so I asked, first
before the session started, I asked Mr. Lewis Lloyd from the
Legislative Council to research this a little bit, I didn't
ask him to prepare a bill, but I asked his opinion on it and he
says yes, he concurred that the law needed to be cleared up and
strengthened.

When the session started he did have a bill

prepared for me on this, I didn't ask him to do this but he did
have a bill prepared.

I took this prepared bill down to the

reference attorneys and asked them to check it over and see if
there was any improvement they could make on this bill, and
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they took this first version and worked it over and came up
with another bill which they printed.

Then I went down to the

Attorney General's office with it, and I also asked that the
reference attorneys if they thought that this law should be
strengthened and cleared up and they said yes, very
definitely.

Then I went to the Attorney General's office and

worked oh about a week in the Attorney General's office and
they also printed another bill for me.

They had the opinion

also that there should be a strengthening in this field, the
law should be clarified and strengthened.

And they printed

a bill for me also. Now this bill as we have it here before
us is the bill as prepared by the Attorney General's office.
I then went reverse on the route back to these reference
attorneys and Mr. Lloyd and had them recheck the bill over
and they said that as far as they was concerned it was a good
bill, and they couldn't find any flaws in it.

We looked mainly

at the fact, and checked very thoroughly, we didn't want to
make a bill that was so harsh that public officials would be
harassed continually by cranks who would want to remove them
from office, but we also wanted to come up with a bill that was
fair and when a person had performed any misconduct in office
where he would come under this law that it was very definite
and clear how he could be removed from office.

And this is

the bill as it is before you now, and I think that's all I need
to say about it, and thank you.
MR. SPEAKER:
Bill 82?

Are you ready for the question on House

Representative Ludwig.
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REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG:

I have a directed question to

Representative Frost.
MR. SPEAKER:

Representative Frost, will you submit to

questions?
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG:

On the ... this covers, of course,

clearly anything below the State level ... would they be considered also ... included the offices of the State in this?
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

Yes, the offices of the State are

already covered under other sections of the Code.

We dis-

cussed that quite thoroughly.
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG:

By impeachment or actually by

this process, there are two different things involved here.
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

Yes, uh, we went into that quite

thoroughly, and I asked that from every one of these different
agencies and they said yes that the State offices are already
covered by this under this Code in a different section, and
they are covered by it already.
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG:

Well they are covered by impeach-

ment proceedings brought only by certain people or are they
covered by a citizen who would be required to the same as this
act would do to minor political subdivisions?
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

I don't know about a citizen taking

action against a State official, if they are covered that way.
That didn't come up in our questions.
MR. SPEAKER:

Representative Ludwig.

REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG:

This bill provides that such

accusations may be initiated by any taxpayer.

What I am asking
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ment proceedings say restricted to say for some of the State
offices, would it be by impeachment by way of the Legislature
or something else so that it is very limited.
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

Well, uh, this act here would not

apply to State officials.

It states here City, County, or

other political subdivisions of this State.

As I understand

it, it did not include the State officials.
REPRESENTATIVE LUDWIG:

Right, I understand that, but my

question was can State officials be reached in a like manner
by the other means which you discussed, or might it be wise
to consider placing them under this also?
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:

I couldn't tell you.

I was in-

formed that ... I did not research this phase of it, but we had

quite

a lot of discussion of this phase and I was informed

that the Code was sufficient for State officials on this.
MR. SPEAKER:

REPRESE~TATIVE

REPRESENTATIVE COX:

COX.

Would the Representative Frost sub-

mit to a question?
MR. SPEAKER:

Representative Frost will you submit to a

question?
REPRESENTATIVE FROST:
REPRESENTATIVE COX:
any taxpayer.

Yes.
Such accusation may be initiated by

Now I am wondering about that, does that mean

that the bum that has brought a pack of cigarettes downtown and
is arrested by the sheriff and taken to the jail because he was
inebriated or was a vagrant, that he could come out of jail day
after tomorrow and by making a sworn statement make that sheriff
defend himself before the District Court, is that the meaning of
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REPRESENTATIVE FROST:
interpretation, yes.

Representative Cox, in one

But you know what I said before,

that we did not make this harsh enough so that any little
picky accusations like that they could commence accusation for removal.
felony to begin with.

They have to be convicted of a
These crimes are spelled out in

the first paragraph very distinctly, and it is so worded
that that is one thing that we wanted to get away from ...
that some crank could not start procedures without any
basis for this procedure.
REPRESENTATIVE COX:

I'll agree that if they are

convicted it has to be of something serious, but is
there anything to stop him from swearing to a statement
and making him defend himself in Court.

Not convict

him, but just defend himself?
REPRESENTATIVE FROST.

The statute, as it now is,

there is nothing now to stop the person from starting
action against any official, but this spells out very
clearly that before anything definitely can be taken
care of or proceedings be started, that he would have
to be proven or it would have to be shown beyond any
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of some of these
crimes.
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